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Abstract
This paper studies the vertical relations between a manufacturer and
one or more retailers over two periods in the presence of a competitive re-
cycling sector. In a bilateral monopoly, contracting is (generally) eﬃcient,
i.e. the manufacturer will produce the joint-profit-maximizing output.
However, both competition downstream and upstream may lead to ineﬃ-
cient outcomes: Under retailer competition, some rent will be siphoned oﬀ
by the recycling sector, and so the manufacturer will either overproduce in
the second period or underproduce in the first period. If instead upstream
entry occurs and full rent extraction is not possible, then the incumbent
may overproduce in the pre-entry period. Vertical restraints that restore
profit maximization (e.g. loyalty rebates) will harm consumers whenever
the manufacturer would overproduce otherwise.
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1 Introduction
The potential anti-competitive eﬀects of vertical restraints in general, and loy-
alty rebates in particular, have been a major concern to antitrust authorities.
Loyalty rebates encompass a wide range of business practices, such as pure
quantity discounts (which may be all-units discounts or incremental-units dis-
counts), bundled discounts, and market-share discounts. So far, US authorities
and courts have refrained from interfering with the use of loyalty rebates, pri-
marily to avoid setting adverse precedents. Instead, the European Commission
has consistently found such rebates to be anti-competitive when employed by
a dominant firm. In fact, market-share discounts and discounts based on pur-
chase growth are per-se illegal. The only admissible type of rebate used to be
a standardized quantity discount. However, in its surprising Michelin II deci-
sion of 2003, the European Commission even found such standardized quantity
discounts to be unlawful.
The Michelin II case concerned the market for replacement truck tires in
France. If a truck owner needs to replace the tires of her truck, she basically
has two options: either buy new tires or buy secondary (”retreaded”) tires
(where ”retreaded” means that the tread of a worn tire casing was renewed).
The retreading technology is available both to manufacturers of new tires and
to a competitive sector of middle-sized firms specialized in retreading. While
retreaded tires are considered inferior substitutes to new ones, they account for
half of the market for replacement tires. Michelin is the dominant manufacturer
of new truck tires in France, and sells its output partly through its own retail
network (Euromaster), and partly through a number of independent dealers.
Michelin’s vertical relations with its dealers where characterized by a number
of rebate and bonus programs for which retailers could qualify. In one of them
(the ”club des amis Michelin”), the ”club” members (some 375 outlets covering
about 20% of the market) would guarantee for a certain ”Michelin temperature”,
i.e. for certain sales volumes and market shares. In return, Michelin would
contribute to investment and training of the retailer’s staﬀ, and also provide
financial contributions.
In its decision, the European Commission found Michelin’s rebate schemes to
be exclusionary, in the sense that Michelin tried to monopolize the retail network
in order to deter entry by competing truck tire manufacturers (like Goodyear or
Continental). In particular, the ”club des amis” was found to amount to a (per-
se illegal) loyalty rebate scheme, i.e. a discount based on market shares rather
than absolute sales thresholds. But there are good reasons to doubt whether
Michelin’s intention was really to exclude. The fact that Michelin’s own retail
network, Euromaster, also carried competing brands is clearly at odds with
the allegation of exclusion. This paper proposes an alternative explanation for
Michelin’s loyalty rebates: that of restoring eﬃciency within the vertical chain
in the presence of a competitive retreading sector. I will identify conditions
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under which such vertical restraints - while not exclusionary - are still welfare-
detrimental, and where they may instead be eﬃciency-enhancing.
The tire industry is not the only industry where primary good producers
coexist with a competitive recycling sector. Another case in point is the internet-
based retailer Amazon; on the one hand, Amazon sells new books and CDs to
final consumers, and on the other, it serves as a platform for peer-to-peer and
business-to-consumer retail trade of used books, CDs and similar items. More
often than not, the same title will be available both ”new” and ”used”, and
Amazon lists them next to each other. Amazon’s relations with publishers and
record labels, i.e. the ”primary output” producers, cannot but take this supply
of secondary goods into account.
Another example that comes to mind are car dealers who carry the new
models of a particular car manufacturer along with used cars of the same brand.
Similarly, many stationery retailers will oﬀer original color cartridges for various
printer brands along with cartridge refills produced by no-name manufacturers
(or they may directly oﬀer the refill service to consumers who bring their empty
cartridges).
The goal of this paper is to study the use of vertical restraints in such
industries where output produced today will reappear on the market as recycled
output tomorrow. I consider a two-period model where a manufacturer of a
recyclable good has to decide how much to produce of its primary good in
each period, and at which price to sell its output to one or more retailers.
A competitive recycling sector will recover and recondition first-period output
(either partially or fully). In period 2, the retailer(s) will then sell the recycled
quantity along with the second-period quantity of the manufacturer’s primary
good.
As a benchmark, I start with the analysis of the bilateral monopoly. I
assume that the eﬃcient outcome (i.e. the outcome that maximizes industry
profits) calls for the retailer to carry both the primary and the recycled good
in period 2 (”multi-product retailing”). At the beginning of each period, the
manufacturer can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the retailer. In the second
period, the retailer can reject the manufacturer’s oﬀer and sell the recycled good
only, where period-2’s supply of recycled output depends on how much of the
primary good was produced in the first period (I assume that there is no supply
of the recycled good in the first period). The retailer’s payoﬀ from this outside
option determines its share in the second-period multi-product profits. I show
that in this setup, contracting will always be eﬃcient: If the retailer can make
upfront payments in the first period (i.e. payments that exceed first-period
profits), then the retailer’s share in the second-period profits will be extracted
by the manufacturer in the first period, thus neutralizing any possible distortion
due to the retailer’s bargaining power in the second period.
This eﬃciency result is in contrast with most of the early literature on the
impact of recycling on monopoly (Swan (1980), Martin (1982)), which found
that the monopolist’s first-period output is likely to be distorted downward; the
rationale for this first-period output contraction is that in the second period, the
recycling sector would steal some of the demand for the monopolist’s primary
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good output. Thus, by reducing first-period output, the monopolist can soften
competition from the recycling sector in the next period.
Instead, in my setting, there is no immediate competition between the man-
ufacturer and the recycling sector: rather, the retailer’s marketing recycled
output in the second period is very similar - if not equivalent - to upstream
entry by another strategic agent. As was shown by Aghion and Bolton (1987),
in a model with sequential contracting, the buyer and the first seller can extract
all the surplus from the second seller by agreeing to an exclusive-dealing con-
tract in which the buyer must pay a lump-sum penalty to the first seller if it
buys from the second seller. The penalty is set high enough to extract all rent,
but not so high as to discourage entry altogether; thus, ineﬃcient exclusion will
never arise. This reasoning carries over to our setting: the manufacturer has
no incentive to pre-empt the entrant-retailer or distort output choices as long
as the manufacturer can fully extract the entrant’s rent at an early contracting
stage. The major diﬀerence to the Aghion and Bolton setting is that, here, the
parts of retailer and entrant are played by the same agent; however, the retailer
cannot aﬀord to reject the manufacturer’s contract in the first period because
failing to market the incumbent’s primary output in the first period implies that
there will be no supply of the recycled good (and hence no rent for the retailer)
in the second period.
In the second major section of this paper, I introduce downstream competi-
tion into the model. I assume that there are two undiﬀerentiated retailers who
first contract with the manufacturer, and then compete for the acquisition of the
recycled good, before oﬀering their supplies on the final consumer market. The
interaction on the recycled good market is modelled as a split-award auction
following Anton and Yao (1989). I argue though that the results do not depend
on this particular allocation mechanism; for instance, when retailers compete à
la Bertrand rather than in bidding functions (a setup similar to the one studied
in Stahl (1988)), the same results can be obtained.
Now, a rather diﬀerent picture emerges: Through the auction mechanism,
some of the rent generated by the vertical structure will be siphoned oﬀ by
the recycling sector. This rent leakage can only be prevented if the manufac-
turer can use vertical restraints which allocate primary and recycled output
eﬃciently across retailers. Otherwise, the manufacturer will either overproduce
the primary good in the second period, or underproduce in the first period.
The contraction of early period output is reminiscent of the early literature
on monopoly and recycling discussed above. There, too, the output distortion
was a reaction to the threat of rent being competed away in the future. In
my setting, however, it is the downstream competition among retailers through
which rent leeks out, not upstream competition between the manufacturer and
the recycling sector. Consequently, the manufacturer may resort to various
vertical restraints to eliminate competition between its retailers. The welfare
eﬀects of such vertical restraints are ambiguous: they are eﬃciency-enhancing
whenever recycled output is in short supply (because they promote early-period
production in this case), but they will harm consumers when recycled output
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is abundant, as they lead to contraction of output in later periods. The latter
result is particularly interesting in a policy context, because most research on
loyalty rebates has so far only found eﬃciency defenses, but rarely oﬀered a
rationale for the skepticism displayed by most antitrust authorities regarding
loyalty rebates.
The last major section of this paper studies the eﬀects of upstream entry
by another manufacturer of primary output in the second period (the retailer
remains a monopolist in both periods). I assume that all players fully anticipate
that entry will occur, and that common agency is the eﬃcient market structure
in this case. Now, the analogy to the Aghion and Bolton (1987) framework
is even stronger. My treatment of the upstream entry case builds on Marx
and Shaﬀer (2004), who generalize the Aghion and Bolton model along several
dimensions and study the impact of the contracting environment on the degree
of rent extraction. They find that bans on below-cost pricing and on market
share contracts lead to imperfect rent extraction, but leave the first seller’s
(contemporaneous) output decisions unaﬀected. My paper complements these
findings by showing how limits on rent shifting aﬀect the incumbent’s pre-entry
output decision. It is straightforward that if rent extraction is complete, the
incumbent’s first-(and second-) period output decision will remain unaﬀected by
future entry. However, if rent extraction is incomplete, and the entrant’s share
in second-period profits depends on the supply of recycled output (because the
latter is in short supply), then the incumbent manufacturer has an incentive to
overproduce in the pre-entry period. Therefore, vertical restraints that emove
the incentive to overproduce harm consumers in the first period, because they
lead to a lower pre-entry output level. However, the eﬀect is short-lived: once the
entrant is established in the market, common agency arises at eﬃcient quantities,
so that the use of (or ban on) vertical restraints only aﬀects the distribution of
these common agency rents among manufacturers, but not the supply to - and
hence the welfare of - consumers.
My results contribute to the recent literature on loyalty rebates, which takes
a contract theoretic approach and shows how the various types of loyalty rebates
can be used to overcome some of the standard problems in vertical relations,
like double marginalization (Kolay, Shaﬀer, and Ordover (2004)), asymmetric
information about the state of demand (Majumdar and Shaﬀer (2007), risk-
aversion (Chioveanu and Akgun (2007)), and asymmetric information about
product quality (Mills (2004)).
Apart from Marx and Shaﬀer (2004), there are very few papers which study
the use of loyalty rebates in a dynamic setting. Ordover and Shaﬀer (2006) an-
alyze a two-period model with two sellers and one buyer where the buyer incurs
switching costs: purchasing a unit from a seller in period 1 locks-in the buyer to
purchasing a unit from the same seller in period 2. In this setting, a dominant
firm can profitably exclude an equally eﬃcient, but financially constrained ri-
val, monopolizing the market when the eﬃcient outcome would have the buyer
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purchase one unit from each seller in each period. This paper is among the very
few in this literature to find an anti-competitive eﬀect of loyalty rebates.
To my knowledge, the only other formal model of exclusionary rebates is
Karlinger and Motta (2007). There, an incumbent and a more eﬃcient entrant
simultaneously make oﬀers to a number of buyers who diﬀer in size. Network
externalities among these buyers imply that the entrant can profitably serve
the market only if it reaches a certain minimum size. The incumbent can then
use rebates to play a ”divide-and-conquer” strategy, thereby breaking entry
equilibria that would exist under uniform linear prices.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the key elements of our
two-period model and studies contracting in the bilateral monopoly structure.
In Section 3, I introduce retailer competition and show that contracts will gen-
erally be ineﬃcient. Finally, Section 4 discusses contracting when a new manu-
facturer enters in the second period, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Benchmark Model of Bilateral Monopoly
2.1 The Model Setup
Consider a monopoly manufacturer, denoted M , and a monopoly retailer, R,
who both operate for two periods, t = 1, 2. In each period,M produces a certain
output level of primary good A, denoted qa in period 1 and qA in period 2. M
incurs total production cost of C (qa) and C (qA), respectively, where C 0 (·) is
well-defined and C0 (·) > 0. In the first period, M sells output qa to R, who
then resells it to final consumers. After t = 1, consumers scrap M ’s first-period
output. Figure 1 illustrates first-period transactions.
The scrap material collected in t = 1 can be recycled and oﬀered in t = 2 as
secondary (or recycled) good B. There is a competitive recycling sector which
retrieves M ’s first-period output and transforms it into good B at marginal
cost of zero. To accommodate possible technological constraints in the recycling
technology, denote by σ ∈ (0, 1) the share of qa that can be recovered, so that
the quantity of recycled good available in t = 2 is qB ≤ σqa. (Note that there
is no supply of recycled good in t = 1). The retailer can buy this supply of
good B from the competitive recycling sector at price cB = 0. For simplicity,
let’s assume that R does not incur any other retailing costs (apart from the
payments R has to make to M and to the recycled good sector).
A consumer in t = 2 will either buy one unit of good A or one unit of good
B (or neither of them). The primary good is unanimously considered to be of
higher quality than the recycled good. Consumers can observe the quality level
of the goods before buying, but they diﬀer in their willingness-to-pay (WTP)
for quality: If the price diﬀerence between goods A and B is suﬃciently large,
some consumers prefer to buy A, and others prefer to buy B. The following
paragraph formalizes this assumption, where DA (pa) denotes aggregate (i.e.
market) demand for good A in t = 1, and market demand for goods A and B
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Manufacturer
Consumers
Retailer
qa, pa
(qa,T(qa))
Recycling Sector
scrap σqa
Figure 1: Transactions in Period 1
in t = 2 is denoted by DA (pA, pB) and DB (pA, pB); pa is good A’s retail price
in period 1 (pA in period 2), and pB is B’s retail price in t = 2. All consumers
face the same flat prices, i.e. we rule out price discrimination by R.
Assumption 1: (i) Consumption decisions in t = 1 are completely inde-
pendent from consumption decisions in t = 2. Thus, DA (pa) is not a function
of (pA, pB).
(ii) There is a range of prices P ∈ R2+ at which demand for both goods
in t = 2 is strictly positive: DA (pA, pB) > 0 and DB (pA, pB) > 0 for all
(pA, pB) ∈ P .
Assumption 1 (i) can be interpreted in several ways: one can think of con-
sumers as having a discount factor of zero (future utility enters present purchas-
ing decisions with a weight of zero), or that there are two consumer cohorts that
do not overlap, each cohort maximizing contemporaneous utility. This assump-
tion eliminates intertemporal considerations at the consumer choice level, in
particular the formation of expectations regarding future goods prices, strategic
deferral of consumption to later periods, or hoarding in early periods. Thus, we
can focus on the impact of the recycling sector on the behavior of the vertical
structure without strategic interference from the consumer side.
Assumption 1 (ii) implies that in t = 2, the retailer can choose between (1)
selling good A only, or (2) selling good B only, or (3) selling both goods (we will
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refer to this case as the multi-product retailing solution). Define industry profits
in period 1 as retail revenue generated by good A minus the cost of producing
good A:
Π (qa) ≡ paqa − C (qa) (1)
while industry profits in period 2 are defined as total revenue generated by goods
A and B minus the production cost of A minus the cost of acquiring good B
from the recycling sector (the bid price for qB , denoted B (qB)):
Π (qA, qB) ≡ pAqA + pBqB − C (qA)−B (qB) (2)
For the case where B (qB) = C (qB) = cBqB = 0, we denote the quantity
pair that maximizes industry profits under multi-product retailing by (q∗A, q
∗
B),
where
(q∗A, q
∗
B) ∈ arg max
qA,qB
Π (qA, qB) s.t. qB ≤ σqa (3)
and the maximum profit that can be obtained under multi-product retailing is
Π (q∗A, q
∗
B) = max
qA,qB
Π (qA, qB) s.t. qB ≤ σqa
Analogously, define the maximum profit if either good A or good B is sold as:
Πi ≡ max
qi
Π (qi, 0) for i ∈ {a,A} (4)
ΠB ≡ max
qB
Π (0, qB) s.t. qB ≤ σqa (5)
In period 1, the output level which maximizes the present discounted value of
industry profits over both periods is defined as:
qea ∈ argmax
qa
{Π (qa, 0) + δΠ (q∗A (qa) , q∗B (qa))} (6)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the firms’ common discount factor on period-2 profits.
Note that the available scrap from t = 1 imposes an upper bound on the quantity
of good B that can be sold in t = 2, so that the output choice in period 1 turns
into an intertemporal optimization problem. We will assume that multi-product
retailing is more profitable than selling only one of the two goods.
Assumption 2: ΠA < Π (q∗A, q
∗
B) and ΠB < Π (q
∗
A, q
∗
B)
Oﬀering both goods allows R to indirectly discriminate among consumers:
the high-WTP consumers will prefer to pay a high price to obtain the primary
(high-quality) good, while low-WTP consumers prefer to pay a low price to
buy the recycled (low-quality) good. Now, oﬀering the low-quality good along
with the high-quality good allows R to serve some (low WTP) consumers who
would not have bought the good otherwise, at the cost of cannibalizing some
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demand for the high-quality good (medium-WTP consumers who would buy
good A if there is no alternative, but who switch to B if they have the choice).
Thus, Assumption 2 states that the first eﬀect dominates the second one, so
that oﬀering good B along with good A increases profits.1
Figure 2 illustrates transactions in Period 2.
Manufacturer
High WTP
Consumers
Retailer
qA, pA
(qA,T(qA))
Recycling Sector
qB, B(qB)
Low WTP
Consumers
qB, pB
Figure 2: Transactions in Period 2
2.2 Equilibrium Contracts
M can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to R at the beginning of each period. Let a
contract signed in period t specify (i) the quantity of good A to be traded in this
period (i.e. either qa or qA), and (ii) the payment to be made to M in period t,
T (qa) or T (qA). Denote such a contract by {qi, T (qi)}, where i ∈ {a,A}. Note
that we do not allow contracts signed in t = 1 to include provisions regarding
period-2 quantities of either good A or B, or regarding payments to be made in
1To be more precise, this discriminatory strategy can only be profitable if oﬀering a second
good raises revenue and this increase in revenue is not outweighed by the extra cost of provid-
ing the second good. Therefore, Assumption 2 imposes constraints not only on the demand
structure, but also on the cost structure of the two goods.
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period 2. I will argue that, under a bilateral monopoly structure, such contracts
can in general implement the eﬃcient outcome.2
Proposition 1: (bilateral monopoly) If R can make upfront payments in
t = 1, then contracting is eﬃcient: M will produce the joint-profit maximizing
output levels in both periods.
Proof: see Appendix
Discussion of Proposition 1 The eﬃciency result of Proposition 1 is in
contrast with most of the early literature on the impact of recycling on monopoly
(Swan (1980), Martin (1982)), which found that the monopolist’s first-period
output is likely to be distorted downward; the rationale for this first-period out-
put contraction is that in the second period, the recycling sector would steal
some of the demand for the monopolist’s primary good output. Thus, by reduc-
ing first-period output, the monopolist can soften competition from the recycling
sector in the next period.
Instead, in my setting, there is no immediate competition between the man-
ufacturer and the recycling sector: rather, the retailer’s marketing recycled out-
put in the second period is very similar - if not equivalent - to upstream entry
by another strategic agent. As was shown by Aghion and Bolton (1987), in a
model with complete information in which the buyer purchases at most one unit
from one of the two sellers and there is sequential contracting, the buyer and
the first seller can extract all the surplus from the second seller by agreeing to
an exclusive-dealing contract in which the buyer must pay a lump-sum penalty
to the first seller if it buys from the second seller. Full rent extraction implies
that ineﬃcient exclusion will never arise.
This reasoning carries over to our setting: the manufacturer has no incentive
to pre-empt the entrant-retailer or distort output choices as long as the manu-
facturer can fully extract the entrant’s rent at an early contracting stage. The
major diﬀerence to the Aghion and Bolton setting is that, here, the parts of
retailer and entrant are played by the same agent; however, the retailer cannot
aﬀord to reject the manufacturer’s contract in the first period because failing
to market the incumbent’s primary output in the first period implies that there
will be no supply of the recycled good (and hence no rent for the retailer) in
the second period. Of course, the more M produces of good A in period 1,
the better is R’s outside option in period 2, and this in turn implies that the
shareM can claim in the period-2 profits decreases. However, if the retailer can
make upfront payments (and the result crucially hinges on this assumption),
then such upfront payments allowM to appropriate the retailer’s second-period
payoﬀ already in the first period, thus neutralizing any distortive eﬀect that the
latter could have on period 1’s output choice.
2Note that I will use the term ”eﬃcient” in the sense of ”maximizing joint profits” (not in
the sense of maximizing social welfare).
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3 Retailer Competition
The structure of bilateral monopoly is very special, if not artificial, and we may
wonder if and to what extent the eﬃciency result obtained for this benchmark
case carries over to other market structures featuring competition either up-
stream or downstream. In this Section, we will study the impact of retailer
competition. Our setup as introduced in Section 2.1 readily accommodates this
case. The extended model is presented in the following.
3.1 New Setup
Let there be two undiﬀerentiated retailers, R1 and R2. In t = 1, each retailer
receives a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer from the manufacturer to buy output levels qa1
and qa2, respectively. (In the following, subscript 1 (2) refers to retailer 1 (2)).
Oﬀers are public and simultaneous. In t = 2, the manufacturer will again oﬀer
contracts, this time for second-period output levels qA1 and qA2, respectively.
After observing the outcome of this contracting stage in t = 2, the two retail-
ers turn to the recycling sector to acquire the recycled good B. The question
arises how to model the competitive interaction between the two retailers on
this recycled good market. In the case of the monopoly retailer, it seemed nat-
ural that with all buyer power concentrated in a single buyer, the latter would
be able to obtain marginal cost prices. With two retailers competing for the
recycled good, and this good being in fixed supply (recall that qB ≤ σqa), prices
will necessarily rise above marginal cost.
I assume that the recycled good is allocated through a split-award auction
as studied in Anton and Yao (1989). In the split-award auction, each retailer
can acquire a share from 0 to 1 of the total supply of σqa, where Retailer 1
buys ασqa, and Retailer 2 buys the remaining (1− α)σqa. Each retailer bids a
price for every possible value of α ∈ [0, 1], so that competition between the two
retailers is in bid functions (not in prices). Denote Retailer 1’s bid function by
B1 (α), and Retailer 2’s bid function by B2 (α). The auctioneer then chooses
the share α∗ ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes the revenue of the suppliers of the recycled
good, i.e.
α∗ ∈ argmaxα {B1 (α) +B2 (α)} (7)
When there are ties and the award choice from (7) is not unique, the appro-
priate tie-breaking rule is to select from among the splits in the set argmax α {B1 (α) +B2 (α)}
the α with the highest joint payoﬀs for both retailers, ΠR1 +ΠR2, where
ΠRi ≡ max
qAi,qBi
{pAqAi + pBqBi|qAj , qBj}
is the maximum revenue that Retailer i generates on the final consumer market
(given own stocks and the rival’s supplies). As discussed in Milgrom (1986), this
procedure mimics the outcome that occurs when bid prices are discrete instead
of continuous because a higher-payoﬀ retailer will avoid a tie by increasing its
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bid by a small amount. If there is a tie in joint payoﬀs as well, choose the highest
among all α∗ with maximal joint payoﬀs, i.e. allocate as much as possible to
Retailer 1 (this is wlog).
Once the supply of the recycled good is allocated among the two retailers,
the latter decide how much to place on the final consumer market, each retailer
being constrained by its own supply of the primary good, qA1 and qA2, and
of the recycled good, α∗σqa and (1− α∗)σqa. Note that we study the case
where the strategic variable is quantity; results are qualitatively the same if
we let retailers compete in prices given their stocks, rather than in quantities.
In this case, equilibria downstream would be analogous to the ones identified
in the price competition stage of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). Apart from
the complication that equilibria may only exist in mixed strategies, the main
insights developed below carry over to Bertrand competition.
Figure 3 illustrates the second stage of the retailer competition game.
Manufacturer
High WTP
Consumers
Retailer 1
(qA1, qB1)
(qA1,T(qA1))
Recycling Sector
αqB, B1(α)
Low WTP
Consumers
Retailer 2
(qA2,T(qA2))
(1-α)qB, B2(α)
(qA2, qB2)
Figure 3: Period 2 of the retailer competition game
Note that there is a subtle but important change in the sequence of moves:
In the previous section, the retailer first decided on how much to sell on the final
market, and then acquired the necessary volumes of good A and B accordingly;
the manufacturer and the recycling sector produced to order. Now, the retailers
choose their stocks independently from - and prior to - their decision on sales
levels. Stocks no longer coincide with sales, but only impose an upper bound on
the latter. This has important implications for the retailers’ objective function
at the last stage of the game: Since payments to the suppliers are sunk, retailers
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simply maximize revenue subject to the constraints implied by their stocks.
3.2 Equilibrium Contracts under Retailer Competition
To characterize the equilibrium outcome of the game defined above, let us first
identify the equilibria in the split-award auction, and then analyze the implica-
tions of this allocation for the contracts between manufacturer and retailers.
Lemma 2: (split-award auction) If the following two conditions are satis-
fied:
(i) qA is small enough so that the residual demand for good B is positive
even if all of good A is placed on the market; and
(ii) wlog qA1 ≥ qA2, i.e. Retailer 1 holds more of good A than Retailer 2.
Then, the unique equilibrium allocation of the split award auction has Re-
tailer 1 acquire the entire supply of good B, i.e. α∗ = 1. Retailer 1’s equilibrium
bid for this allocation is equal to Retailer 2’s bid for the monopoly over good B,
i.e. B∗1 (1) = B
∗
2 (0), and Retailer 2 will bid
B∗2 (0) = ΠR2 (qA1, qA2, 0, qB2)−ΠR2 (qA1, qA2, qB1, 0)
Proof: see Appendix
Discussion of Lemma 2 Figure 4 shows how all possible outcomes of the
split award auction map into equilibrium supplies on the final consumer market.
The dotted lines denote the retailers’ Cournot best response functions. The two
retailers are asymmetric in their stocks of good A, which determines the locus of
their reaction functions in the supply of good B: Retailer 1 holds more of good
A, which implies that R1’s reaction function for good B is closer to the origin
than Retailer 2’s. The grey hatched represents the set of all possible levels of
downstream supply of good B for any given level of σqa. Interior solutions will
arise if both retailers are quantity constrained, i.e. if the upstream supply of
good B, σqa, is not suﬃcient to play an allocation on the borders of the hatched
area, i.e. a point on (one or both of the) reaction functions.
Consider instead a level of σqa that is everywhere outside the grey hatched
area. The thin black line denoted ”upstream supply of B” shows one such level.
Each point on this line represents a possible allocation of this output across
the two retailers. The point where this line intersects the x-axis represents
the allocation where Retailer 1 wins the entire supply, i.e. when α = 1. This
allocation maps into a downstream supply of good B identified by the point
where R1’s reaction function intersects the x-axis, i.e. qB (α = 1). At this point,
aggregate downstream supply of good B reaches its minimum. As we move up
along the upstream supply line, i.e. as we reallocate supplies away from R1 and
towards R2, downstream equilibrium allocations move up along R1’s reaction
function, and aggregate supply expands. One such case is represented by the
horizontal arrow connecting the upstream supply line andR1’s reaction function.
At the upstream allocation identified as point B, the downstream game reaches
12
the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium, point C. Any allocation on the segment
A−B will map into the same downstream equilibrium C. As we increase R2’s
stocks even beyond point A, R1 will now be quantity constrained, and the
downstream equilibrium will lie on the corresponding point of R2’s reaction
function. One such case is represented by the vertical arrow connecting the
upstream supply line and R2’s reaction function.
q1
q2
R2‘s reaction function
R1‘s reaction function
45°
upstream supply of B
α = 1
α = 0
C
qB(α=1)
A
B
Figure 4: How upstream allocations of good B translate into downstream equi-
librium supply
Figure 5 shows how all possible upstream allocations translate into down-
stream equilibrium payoﬀs, which in turn determine upstream bids. Each point
on the x-axis represents a particular value of α, i.e. a particular split of the
upstream supply of good B among retailers, while the solid black line shows
the corresponding aggregate payoﬀs (i.e. the sum of both retailers’ downstream
revenues), holding the supply and allocation of good A constant.
When α = 0, Retailer 2 acquires the entire supply of good B and makes
profits Π2 (α = 0) = ΠR2 (qA1, qA2, 0, qB2), while Retailer 1 makes Π1 (α = 0) =
ΠR1 (qA1, qA2, 0, qB2). As α increases, downstream supply of good B will in-
crease, and so aggregate payoﬀs will fall. Recall that for values of α corre-
sponding to allocations on the segment A − B in Figure 4, the downstream
equilibrium is the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium, and so aggregate payoﬀs
are constant and minimal in this range. As we move beyond point B, aggregate
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Joint 
profits
α
BA
Π1(α = 0) + 
Π2(α = 0)
Π1(α = 1) + 
Π2(α = 1)
R2 is monopolist
over B
R1 is monopolist
over B
Cournot equilibrium
Π2(α = 0)
Π2(α = 1)
Figure 5: Industry profits as a function of the upstream split α
payoﬀs rise again because Retailer 2 is now capacity constrained, and they reach
their maximum at α = 1, when all supplies of good B are held by the retailer
who also holds more of good A, i.e. Retailer 1. Figure 5 illustrates the case
where the inequality in expression (10) is strict, so that Retailer 1 can always
outbid Retailer 2 in the auction. We see that there the only possible equilib-
rium is α = 1: If bids on any other allocation α˜ 6= 1 yielded higher revenue for
the auctioneer, B1 (α˜) +B2 (α˜) > B1 (1) +B2 (1), then Retailer 1 could always
profitably deviate by reducing the own bid on allocation α˜ and/or increasing
B1 (1) suﬃciently to induce allocation α = 1 while increasing own payoﬀs.
Let us now study the implications of the split award auction for contracts
within the vertical chain.
Proposition 3: (retailer competition) If there are two competing retailers,
then contracting is ineﬃcient: (i) Either M overproduces in period 2, (ii) or
M underproduces in period 1.
Proof: see Appendix
Discussion of Proposition 3 It emerges clearly from Lemma 2 that the
best way for M to allocate qA across retailers in the second period is to con-
centrate the entire stock on one retailer, in our case Retailer 1. This maximizes
profits for two reasons: (i) Since Retailer 1 will also win the split award auc-
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tion and hence be the monopoly seller of the recycled good, concentrating all
of qA on the same retailer ensures that the latter takes into account the full
externalities of good B on good A when deciding on how much to sell of good
B; (ii) If the losing retailer, here Retailer 2, does not hold any of good A, its
profitability of marketing good B is minimized (again because of the externality
argument), and so Retailer 2’s bid in the split award auction is reduced for any
level of α. This implies that the price at which the winning retailer can acquire
the recycled output is minimized. Now, Retailer 2’s bid price will either be a
(decreasing) function of qA (because qA determines how much residual demand
is left for good B), in which case M will have an incentive to overproduce in
period 2, or Retailer 2’s bid price is an (increasing) function of σqa (because the
resource constraint is binding), in which case M will want to underproduce in
period 1.
If we compare the result of Proposition 3 to the benchmark case of bilat-
eral monopoly, we see that retailer competition gives rise to ineﬃcient output
choices. Through the auction mechanism that allocates the recycled output
among retailers, some of the rent generated by the vertical structure will be
siphoned oﬀ by the recycling sector. To reduce this rent loss, the manufac-
turer may therefore either overproduce the primary good in the second period,
or underproduce in the first period. The contraction of early period output is
reminiscent of the early literature on monopoly and recycling discussed in the
previous section. In those studies, too, the output distortion was a reaction to
the threat of rent being competed away in the future. In my setting, however,
it is the downstream competition among retailers through which rent leaks out,
not upstream competition between the manufacturer and the recycling sector.
Interestingly, it may also be the case that early output is completely unaf-
fected by retailer competition. Instead, the prospect of having part of the rent
extracted by the recycling sector will lead the manufacturer to overproduce in
the second period: the more primary output is available in the second period,
the lower the residual demand for good B. This in turn lowers the price that
the losing retailer is willing to pay, and hence the price at which the winning
retailer can acquire the stock of recycled output. This eﬀect can only arise if we
allow the manufacturer to set second-period output levels and contract with re-
tailers before the latter meet in the split award auction. Having the first-mover
advantage, our manufacturer can commit to a high primary output level in the
second period, thereby favorably manipulating the outcome of the recycled good
auction.
It is also worth noting that the results of Lemma 2 and Proposition 3 do not
depend on the particular auction format analyzed there. Analogous results can
be obtained in a more common setting where retailers compete in flat prices
rather than in bid functions. Similarly to the case of the split award auction,
the existence of a Nash equilibrium when retailers compete for supplies in flat
prices crucially depends on a careful definition of tie-breaking rules. This point
was first highlighted by Stahl (1988). Stahl considers a two-stage model where
two retailers (or merchants) first compete à la Bertrand for the acquisition of
stocks. Then, provided they both hold positive stocks, they play a capacity-
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constrained Bertrand game on the final consumer market. If the merchants’ bid
prices upstream are such that pi > pj , then merchant i acquires the entire supply
at price pi, S (pi), and is the monopolist on the final consumer market, where it
sells up to S (pi) (or the monopoly quantity, if its stocks exceed the monopoly
quantity). If instead there is a tie in bid prices upstream, pi = pj , then each
merchant acquires half of the entire supply S (pi), and faces competition from
the other merchant on the final consumer market. The equilibrium on the final
consumer market will then be of the type analyzed by Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983).
Stahl (1988) shows that if the revenue-maximizing price on the final con-
sumer market is above the Walrasian price, then this two-stage game does not
have a Nash equilibrium (neither in pure nor in mixed strategies): The two
merchants will bid up the price on the supply market to the level where the
monopoly merchant could just break even downstream. But since both mer-
chants will bid this same price, both will obtain positive stocks. This implies
that their expected payoﬀs from sales downstream will fall short of monopoly
profits, as some rent will be competed away. In other words, merchants are
bound to make losses, and this cannot be an equilibrium. As shown in Stahl
(1988), one way out of the non-existence problem is to adjust the tie-breaking
rule so that in case of a tie, the entire stock is randomly assigned to one of the
two merchants, rather than allocating half of it to each merchant.
In the richer setting of a split award auction chosen here, bid prices are
contingent on the quantity that the retailer wants to acquire at this price. In
particular, the oﬀer to pay the monopoly price is only valid if the auctioneer
assigns the entire stock of the recycled good to this bidder. Thus, in our setup
it can never happen that a retailer pays a price upstream that can only be
covered by monopoly rents downstream, only to discover that it will instead
face a Bertrand competitor downstream.
Vertical Restraints and Welfare Eﬀects We can now identify the wel-
fare eﬀects of vertical restraints that allow the manufacturer to implement the
joint profit maximizing outputs in both periods. For instance, the manufacturer
could require Retailer 1 to sell output levels (γq∗A, q
∗
B), while Retailer 2 is in-
duced to sell ((1− γ) q∗A, 0), where γ ∈ [0, 1]. Since Retailer 2 is not allowed to
sell any of the recycled good, it will not participate in the split award auction,
so that Retailer 1 can buy the recycled output at the competitive price cB = 0.
Thus, the manufacturer ensures that the profit-maximizing outputs are sold to
final consumers, and that none of the rent generated by the vertical structure
leaks out to the recycling sector. It is quite intuitive that consumers will ben-
efit from such vertical restraints as long as the available output increases as a
result, while consumers are harmed if output contracts. The following corollary
argues that if recycled output is abundant, vertical restraints are likely to harm
consumers because they remove the manufacturer’s incentive to overproduce in
the second period. Therefore, Corollary 4 identifies possible anti-competitive
eﬀects of vertical restraints (e.g. fidelity rebates), in contrast to most of the
16
recent literature on fidelity rebates, which generally produces eﬃciency results
and do not provide a rationale for policy intervention.
Corollary 4: Suppose the manufacturer imposes quantity targets which re-
store joint profit maximization. Then, such vertical restraints will
(i) harm consumers and reduce welfare if there is abundant supply of the
recycled output;
(ii) benefit consumers and enhance welfare if the recycled output is in short
supply.
Proof: see Appendix
4 Upstream Entry
In this section, we will revisit the question of upstream entry that we alluded
to in our discussion of the exclusionary allegations against Michelin (see Intro-
duction). We consider a situation where the manufacturer anticipates entry of
a diﬀerentiated rival manufacturer, and we ask how the manufacturer’s vertical
relations with a monopoly retailer will be aﬀected by the prospect of upstream
entry in the future.
4.1 New Setup
Again, firms operate for two periods. In the first period, the incumbent man-
ufacturer, denoted M1, oﬀers a contract to the monopoly retailer R regarding
first-period output qa. In period 2, a second manufacturer, denoted M2, enters
the industry. The two manufacturers are diﬀerentiated, and ΠCA denotes in-
dustry profits under common agency, while ΠEDi denotes the joint payoﬀ of the
Mi −R pair when excluding Mj . We make the following assumption:
Assumption 3: Common agency yields higher industry profits than exclu-
sion of either of the two manufacturers: ΠCA > ΠEDi for i = 1, 2
AfterM2 entered, each manufacturer oﬀers a contract to R regarding second-
period output levels qA1 and qA2 (where subscripts 1,2 now refer to Manufacturer
1 and 2, respectively). Contracting in the second period is sequential: First the
incumbent moves, the retailer accepts or rejects, then the entrant proposes a
contract, and again the retailer has to decide whether to accept or not. Then,
the retailer buys recycled output qB from the recycling sector, and chooses the
output levels qA1 and qA2 and to sell along with qB on the final consumers,
given the retailer’s contracts with the manufacturers. This sequence of moves
is chosen on purpose to allow for rent extraction by the incumbent, thus ruling
out ineﬃcient exclusion where it can be prevented if appropriate contracts can
be written.
Figure 6 illustrates the second stage of the common agency game.
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Manufacturer1
High WTP
Consumers
Retailer
qA1, pA1
(qA1,T(qA1)) Recycling Sector
qB, cB
Low WTP
Consumers
Manufacturer 2
(qA2,T(qA2))
qA2, pA2 qB, pB
Figure 6: Transactions after upstream entry occurred
4.2 Equilibrium Contracts under Vertical Entry
Consider the market structure that will arise in period 2. We know from Bern-
heim and Whinston (1985) that two-part tariﬀs are suﬃcient to achieve common
agency. Moreover, with sequential contracting, there is scope for rent extrac-
tion by the incumbent, which - if successful - will prevent ineﬃcient exclusion.
Aghion and Bolton (1987) showed that under complete information, the buyer
and the first seller can extract all the surplus from the second seller by agree-
ing to an exclusive-dealing contract in which the buyer must pay a lump-sum
penalty to the first seller if it buys from the second seller. Full rent extraction
implies that ineﬃcient exclusion will never arise. Now, this result was obtained
for a very special environment: the buyer purchases at most one unit from one of
the two sellers, the sellers have all the bargaining power, and the first seller can
perfectly predict the entrant’s eﬃciency. Relaxing the assumption of complete
information with respect to the entrant’s production cost generates cases where
ineﬃcient exclusion may arise as a result of rent-shifting contracts between the
buyer and the first seller.
Subsequent research generalized the Aghion and Bolton (1987) model to gen-
eral demand functions (instead of unit demands) and general distributions of
bargaining power, and highlighted the importance of the contracting environ-
ment for the rent-shifting mechanism. In particular, Marx and Shaﬀer (2004)
study the impact of various constraints on the structure of supply contracts (no
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below-cost prices, no market share contracts) on the degree of rent extraction
under complete information. They find that both bans on below-cost pricing
and on market share contracts can lead to imperfect rent extraction, but will
leave the first seller’s contemporaneous output decisions unaﬀected (correspond-
ing to second-period outputs in my setting). Now, my findings complement their
results in showing how incomplete rent extraction aﬀects pre-entry output de-
cisions, i.e. the supply of recycled material in the post-entry period.
Proposition 5: (upstream entry) Suppose that a second manufacturer en-
ters in period 2 and a common agency equilibrium arises.
(i) If rent extraction in period 2 is complete, or the supply of the recycled
good is so abundant that it does not aﬀect the entrant’s minmax payoﬀ, then
contracting is eﬃcient in both periods.
(ii) If rent extraction in period 2 is incomplete and the recycled good is in
short supply, then the incumbent has an incentive to overproduce in the pre-entry
period.
Proof: see Appendix
Discussion of Proposition 5 Applying this result to the Michelin case
discussed in the Introduction, our analysis suggests that the purpose of Miche-
lin’s vertical restraints was not to exclude other tire manufacturers, but rather
to appropriate as much as possible of their rents. The question then is what the
likely eﬀects of such rent extraction clauses are on consumers and total welfare.
Proposition 5 suggests that such clauses lead to a reduction in pre-entry output.
The reason is that absent vertical restraints, an abundant supply of the recy-
cled good becomes a powerful instrument in extracting additional rents from
the entrant. But if the incumbent can use market share contracts, pre-entry
output loses its strategic role, and so the incumbent will reduce it to its ”non-
strategic” level. Since pre-entry output distortions only go in one direction,
namely overproduction, even partially successful vertical restraints will reduce
pre-entry output and therefore unambiguously harm consumers in this period.
However, the eﬀect is only short-lived: in the post-entry period, the ”strategic”
supply of the recycled good only matters along the oﬀ-equilibrium path. In
equilibrium, common agency arises at eﬃcient quantities, so that the use of (or
ban on) vertical restraints only aﬀects the distribution of these common agency
rents among manufacturers, but not the supply to - and hence the welfare of -
consumers.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to study the vertical relations in an industry
where a monopoly manufacturer of a recyclable good has to decide how much
to produce of its primary good in each period, and how much to charge its
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retailer(s) for it. The presence of a competitive recycling sector aﬀects contrac-
tual relations in two ways: on the one hand, it allows the vertical structure
to increase its profits through quality discrimination on the consumer market.
On the other hand, it may lead to output distortions if the monopolist cannot
appropriate the full rent generated by its output in both periods.
Whether or not an ineﬃciency arises depends on the industry structure: In
the benchmark case of bilateral monopoly, contracting will always be eﬃcient:
If the retailer can make upfront payments in the first period, then the retailer’s
share in the second-period profits will be appropriated by the manufacturer in
the first period, thus neutralizing any possible distortion due to the retailer’s
bargaining power in the second period. The intermediation of a monopoly re-
tailer ensures that the manufacturer does not compete neck-and-neck with the
competitive recycling sector; therefore, all profits will be absorbed by theM−R
chain, and the eﬃcient quantities of both goods are sold.
When there are two undiﬀerentiated retailers who first contract with the
manufacturer, and then compete for the acquisition of the recycled good, the
outcome changes significantly: Since retailers now compete for the supplies of
the recycled good, they will bid up the price of this good, so that some of the
rent generated by the vertical structure will be siphoned oﬀ by the recycling
sector. To reduce this rent loss, the manufacturer may therefore either over-
produce the primary good in the second period, or underproduce in the first
period. Vertical restraints which restore the joint profit maximizing outcome
have ambiguous welfare eﬀects: they are eﬃciency-enhancing to the extent that
they promote early-period production, but they will harm consumers when they
lead to contraction of output in later periods.
Finally, the paper addresses upstream entry in the second period, assuming
that common agency is the eﬃcient market structure in this case. Now, if
the incumbent-retailer pair can extract all the rent generated in the post-entry
period, the incumbent’s first-period output decision will remain unaﬀected by
future entry. However, if the entrant receives a positive share in second-period
profits, and this share depends on the supply of recycled output (because the
latter is in short supply), then the incumbent manufacturer has an incentive to
produce more than the industry-profit maximizing level in the pre-entry period.
Therefore, vertical restraints harm consumers in the first period, to the extent
that they remove the incentive to overproduce, and therefore lead to a lower
pre-entry output level. However, the eﬀect is short-lived: once the entrant is
established in the market, common agency arises at eﬃcient quantities, so that
the use of (or ban on) vertical restraints only aﬀects the distribution of these
common agency rents among manufacturers, but not the supply to - and hence
the welfare of - consumers.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 The proof is constructive and fully characterizes
the optimal contracts.
Contracting in Period 2
Let us first consider the retailer’s problem in period 2. (i) Multi-product
retailing: Suppose the retailer accepted M ’s oﬀer to buy good A under tariﬀ
T (qA). Then, being the monopoly buyer of the recycled good, the retailer
can acquire up to the entire supply of good B at marginal cost, i.e. B (qB) =
cBqB = 0. Therefore, the retailer’s problem is to maximize its payoﬀ ΠR (qA, qB)
by choosing how much to sell of goods A and B:
maxqA,qB ΠR (qA, qB) = pAqA + pBqB − T (qA)− cBqB
s.t. qB ≤ σqa
(8)
The manufacturer can always induce the retailer to choose the quantity levels
that maximize industry profits, (q∗A, q
∗
B), oﬀering the appropriate tariﬀ T (qA),
for instance a two-part tariﬀ T (qA) = wqA + F , where w = C 0 (q∗A), and F
determines how these profits are distributed within the vertical chain.
(ii) Outside option: If instead R rejects M ’s oﬀer, R’s outside option is to
sell good B only. Thus, R’s disagreement payoﬀ is ΠB as defined in expression
(5); this is the minimum payoﬀ thatM must oﬀer for R to acceptM ’s contract.
Note that R’s payoﬀ ΠB may or may not depend on M ’s first-period output
level qa: If the resource constraint qB ≤ σqa is not binding in the oﬀ-equilibrium
scenario where only good B is traded, i.e. if argmaxqB Π (0, qB) < σqa, then
ΠB will be a function of demand and cost parameters. If instead the constraint
is binding, then ΠB is a function of qa. Of course the level of qa is predeter-
mined in period 2 (and can no longer be changed by either of the two parties).
But whenever qa also determines the retailer’s disagreement payoﬀ, period-2
contracting outcomes will be linked to period-1 output decisions.
(iii) Equilibrium contracts: Turning back to the multi-product retailing sce-
nario, with total industry profits being Π (q∗A, q
∗
B) as defined in expression (3),
it follows that M can appropriate at most Π (q∗A, q
∗
B) − ΠB (qa) out of these
profits. For completeness, we have to allow for the resource constraint to be
binding also under multi-product retailing.3 If this is the case, then we have a
corner solution in the second period, and so the optimal levels of q∗A and q
∗
B will
both be functions of qa. Otherwise, q∗A and q
∗
B only depend on the demand and
cost parameters in period 2.
Trade will occur under the following terms:½
qA = q
∗
A (qa)
T (q∗A, qa) = Π (q
∗
A (qa) , q
∗
B (qa)) + C (q
∗
A (qa))−ΠB (qa)
¾
(9)
3Note that we have q∗B < argmaxqB Π (0, qB), i.e. the retailer will want to expand its
supply of good B whenever R does not sell any of good A; thus, if the resource constraint
is binding in the multi-product retailing scenario, it is also binding under the outside option,
but the reverse need not hold.
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R will sell q∗A units of good A and q
∗
B units of good B, and generate total
profits of Π (q∗A (qa) , q
∗
B (qa)). Note that M ’s choice of period-2 output is not
aﬀected by the payment of ΠB (qa) to R, because the latter only depends on
last period’s output qa. Thus, M has no incentive to distrot period-2 output
levels away from the joint industry profit maximizing ones.
Contracting in Period 1
Without any recycled good available, R’s only outside option in t = 1 is not
to sell anything at all. However, rejecting M ’s contract in t = 1 also implies
reducing the disagreement payoﬀ in t = 2 to zero: If none of the primary good is
produced and sold today, there is no supply of the recycled good tomorrow, and
so the retailer has no fall-back option tomorrow. Given the optimal first-period
output level, q∗a (to be determined below), M can therefore extract from R the
full first-period revenue plus the discounted disagreement payoﬀ in period 2:½
qa = q
∗
a
T (q∗a) = Π (q
∗
a, 0) + C (q
∗
a) + δΠB (q
∗
a)
¾
This rent extraction mechanism will only work if the retailer has access to exter-
nal funds, because T (q∗a) exceeds the retailer’s period-1 revenue: The diﬀerence
between the two is the retailer’s upfront payment δΠB (q∗a), which the retailer
can recoup in the second period.
Now, what is the optimal first-period output level for M? M seeks to max-
imize the present discounted value of its payoﬀs over both periods, so that M ’s
profit maximization problem reads
max
qa
{T (qa)− C (qa) + δ [T (q∗A, qa)− C (q∗A)]}
Note that the term δΠB (qa) in T (qa) cancels with the term −ΠB (qa) in the
discounted second-period payment T (q∗A, qa), so that M ’s problem reduces to
max
qa
{Π (qa, 0) + δΠ (q∗A (qa) , q∗B (qa))}
But this expression is identical to the joint profit maximization problem solved
by
qea ∈ argmax
qa
{Π (qa, 0) + δΠ (q∗A (qa) , q∗B (qa))}
as defined in expression (6) and will therefore yield the same, i.e. the eﬃcient,
output level, qea.
Thus, we showed that both in period 1 and in period 2 the manufacturer
will produce the joint profit maximizing output level of the primary good, so
that contracting in the bilateral monopoly is shown to be eﬃcient.2
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Proof of Lemma 2 At the last stage of the game, retailers have to decide
how much to sell of both goods to consumers, given their stocks. Since good
A is of superior quality and hence commands a higher price than good B, a
revenue-maximizing retailer will always sell all its stocks of A before starting
to oﬀer good B. If condition (i) of Lemma 2 is satisfied, there is still positive
demand for good B even if all of qA is placed on the market. When choosing
their supplies qB1 and qB2, retailers play a capacity-constrained Cournot game
over good B. We have to distinguish two cases:
(i) the joint profit maximizing level of good B exceeds the available quantity
of it, i.e. q∗B > σqa; in this case, it does not matter how σqa is distributed
among the retailers (i.e. how the split award auction allocated σqa), as they
will always place their entire stocks - and hence the constrained optimal quantity
- on the market: If the supply of good B downstream is competitive, then the
individual supplier undervalues the eﬀect of the marginal unit it supplies on the
price of all inframarginal units (own and competitor’s units). If unconstrained,
aggregate supply will exceed monopoly supply; but since monopoly supply is
already unfeasible (because q∗B > σqa), we can be sure that retailers will place
the entire σqa on the market.
(ii) the resource constraint is not binding at the joint profit maximizing
level of good B, i.e. q∗B < σqa; then, the distribution of σqa across retailers
as induced by the split award auction will matter for the final outcome: If all
supplies of good B are concentrated on one retailer, i.e. if α∗ = 0 or α∗ = 1, the
retailer who has the monopoly on good B will internalize all the eﬀects that an
additional unit of good B has on the price of the latter and on that retailer’s
supply of good A. If instead an ε of the very same total supply of good B is
redistributed to the other retailer, the total amount of good B oﬀered on the
final consumer market cannot but increase.
Aggregate payoﬀs of the capacity-constrained Cournot game are continuous
in quantities and locally maximized at monopoly outcomes α = 0 and α = 1.
Thus, there are only two candidate equilibria for the split-award auction: α∗ = 0
and α∗ = 1. To determine the overall equilibrium, we have to find the global
maximum of the aggregate payoﬀ function. By condition (ii) of Lemma 2,
Retailer 1 holds (weakly) more of good A than Retailer 2, which implies that
Retailer 1 will also make (weakly) higher profits on marketing good B, because
Retailer 1 internalizes more externalities of the supply of B on the price of A
than Retailer 2 does. Therefore:
(i) If Retailer 1 holds strictly more of good A, qA1 > qA2, then aggregate
profits generated downstream are (weakly) higher if Retailer 1 markets good B
rather than Retailer 2:
ΠR1 (qA1, qA2, qB1, 0) +ΠR2 (qA1, qA2, qB1, 0) ≥ ΠR1 (qA1, qA2, 0, qB2) +ΠR2 (qA1, qA2, 0, qB2)
(10)
where the inequality is strict whenever qB1 < qB2 ≤ σqa, i.e. whenever Retailer
1 resells strictly less of good B than would Retailer 2, because Retailer 1 wants
to ”protect” demand for good A. Note that this is more likely to happen the
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more the available stocks of good A are concentrated on Retailer 1, and that
qB1 > q
∗
B as long as qA1 < q
∗
A.
Rearranging inequality (10), we obtain a ranking of the upper bounds on
both Retailer’s bids, with each retailer being willing to bid up to the additional
profits it can generate on good B if winning the total supply:
ΠR1 (qA1, qA2, qB1, 0)−ΠR1 (qA1, qA2, 0, qB2) ≥ ΠR2 (qA1, qA2, 0, qB2)−ΠR2 (qA1, qA2, qB1, 0)
If the inequality is strict (again, this is the case whenever qB1 < qB2 ≤ σqa),
Retailer 1 can always outbid the other retailer, oﬀering B1 (1) = B2 (0) + ε
to induce α = 1, where ε can be arbitrarily small. In equilibrium, the losing
retailer, R2, will bid:
B∗2 (0) ≡ ΠR2 (qA1, qA2, 0, qB2)−ΠR2 (qA1, qA2, qB1, 0) (11)
and Retailer 1 exactly matches Retailer 2’s bid: B∗1 (1) = B
∗
2 (0); of course, re-
tailers oﬀer zero for the allocation in which they get nothin of good B: B∗1 (0) =
B∗2 (1) = 0. With two allocations yielding the same maximal aggregate revenue,
we have to invoke our tie-breaking rule: If the set argmax α {B1 (α) +B2 (α)}
is not a singleton, the auctioneer picks the α at which retailers’ joint payoﬀs
are highest, in this case α = 1. (There are also equilibria in which Retailer
2’s bid exceeds B∗2 (0) as defined in expression (11) - such bids can sustain an
equilibrium as long as they are matched by Retailer 1 - but in these equilibria,
Retailer 2 clearly plays a strategy that is dominated by B∗2 (0).)
(ii) If there is a tie in the stocks each retailer holds of good A, qA1 = qA2,
or if inequality (10) holds with equality, then the two retailers are perfectly
symmetric in the split-award auction, and aggregate payoﬀs are exactly the
same at α = 0 and α = 1, so that none of them can outbid the other. In this
case, each of them will bid up to its entire payoﬀ from obtaining the entire stock,
B∗1 (1) = B
∗
2 (0), and our tie-breaking rule calls for the auctioneer to choose the
highest of all α’s in the set argmax α {B1 (α) +B2 (α)}, which is α = 1. Again,
Retailer 1 obtains the entire supply, as claimed in Lemma 2.¤
Proof of Proposition 3 We already argued in the Proof of Lemma 2 that
retailers are revenue-maximizers at the last stage of the game, and so they will
always sell all of their supplies of good A before selling any of good B: If there
is a consumer willing to buy one unit of good B at a positive price, the same
consumer would also be willing to buy a unit of good A instead, and even at
a higher price. Thus, if the retailer still has positive stocks of both goods, it is
more profitable to sell good A until stocks are depleted, and then start selling
good B.
(i) Suppose the manufacturer supplies so much of good A that residual de-
mand for good B drops to zero; call this output level qˆA. Then, the retailers’
equilibrium bids in the split award auction are
B1 (α) = B2 (α) = 0 for all α ∈ [0, 1]
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By Assumption 2, ΠA < Π (q∗A, q
∗
B). Since ΠA ≡ maxqA Π (qA, 0) ≥ Π (qA, 0) for
all qA, we have that
Π (qˆA, 0) > Π (q
∗
A, q
∗
B)
i.e. the industry profits at output level qˆA fall short of the maximal multi-
product retailing profits Π (q∗A, q
∗
B). The reason is that manufacturer overpro-
duces in period 2, qˆA > q∗A. If, under retailer competition, multi-product re-
tailing is not feasible, and the manufacturer finds it optimal to produce qˆA
instead (thus foreclosing the recycling sector), then contracting is clearly ineﬃ-
cient because the manufacturer overproduces in period 2, as claimed in part (i)
of Proposition 3.
(ii) Next, consider the case where the manufacturer instead supplies a quan-
tity of good A small enough to leave some demand for good B. Then, the
conditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied, and a forward-looking manufacturer will
anticipate the outcome of the auction as characterized in Lemma 2. Given any
level of qA < qˆA, how should the manufacturer allocate good A across retailers?
M will optimally concentrate the entire supply of good A on one retailer (in
this case on Retailer 1). This increases profits in two ways: first of all, it en-
sures that the retailer who will market good B does so taking into account the
full externalities good B has on the price of good A: if Retailer 1 only holds
a fraction of qA, it will only internalize a fraction of the externalities of good
B, i.e. good B will be oversupplied; second, withdrawing all supplies of good
A from Retailer 2 (the losing retailer in the split-award auction) reduces the
profitability of the latter under all possible outcomes of the auction, i.e. for
all values of α, and in particular for α = 0 (the reason being again the lack of
internalization of externalities on good A). Now, Retailer 2’s payoﬀ along the
oﬀ-equilibrium path where it wins the entire supply of good B will determine
its bid for this quantity in the auction:
B∗2 (0) = ΠR2 (qA1, 0, 0, qB2)−ΠR2 (qA1, 0, qB1, 0) = ΠR2 (qA1, 0, 0, qB2)
The last equality follows from ΠR2 (qA1, 0, qB1, 0) = 0: If Retailer 2 has zero
supplies of both goods, it can only make zero revenue downstream. By Lemma 2,
this value sets the threshold for the winning retailer’s equilibrium bid, B∗1 (1) =
B∗2 (0).
To summarize, we can write M ’s problem in period 2 as:
max
qA
Π (qA) = pAqA − C (qA) + pBqB (qA)−B∗2 (0) (12)
where qA as oﬀered by M coincides with the downstream supply of Retailer 1,
while the retailer’s choice of good B, qB (qA), will depend on the level of good
A imposed by qA. We see immediately that this expression diﬀers from the one
underlying joint profit maximization as in (3) because the bid price for good
B has increased from cBq∗B = 0 to Π2 (0, qB2). This implies that the profits
appropriated by the M −R1 chain will be lower than under bilateral monopoly,
because competition for the supplies of the recycled good will bid up their price,
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thus generating rents for the recycling sector. How does this ”leakage” aﬀect
M ’s choice of good A?
The answer to this question lies in the terms that enter
B∗2 (0) = max
qB2≤σqa
ΠR2 (qA1, 0, 0, qB2)
Again, we have to distinguish two cases:
(i) Suppose that argmaxqB2≤σqa ΠR2 (qA1, 0, 0, qB2) < σqa, i.e. the resource
constraint is not binding in the optimization problem underlying Retailer 2’s
equilibrium bid in the split award auction. Then, Retailer 2’s optimal choice of
qB2 will be a function of Retailer 1’s supply of good A, i.e. qB2 (qA1): The higher
is qA1, the lower is the residual demand that Retailer 2 receives for its supply
of good B along the oﬀ-equilibrium path where Retailer 2 wins the split-award
auction, and hence the lower the price Retailer 2 would bid for good B. Thus,
by expanding period-2 output of good A beyond the joint-profit maximizing
level q∗A, the M −R1 chain can reduce the payoﬀ made to the recycling sector,
though at the expense of distorting the market shares of primary to recycled
good. This completes the proof of part (i) of Proposition 3.
(ii) Suppose instead that argmaxqB2 ΠR2 (qA1, 0, 0, qB2) = σqa, i.e. the re-
source constraint is binding in the optimization problem underlying Retailer 2’s
equilibrium bid in the split award auction. Then, B∗2 (0) is a function of qa: The
more recycled output is available, the higher are Retailer 2’s profits along the
oﬀ-equilibrium path where Retailer 2 wins the split-award auction, and hence
the higher the payment that theM−R1 chain will have to make to buy good B.
This introduces a distortion of a diﬀerent kind: M will want to underproduce
in period 1, thereby reducing supply of the recycled good in period 2, and hence
reducing the M − R1 chain’s price of acquiring good B. This completes the
proof of part (ii) of Proposition 3.2
Proof of Corollary 4 follows immediately from Proposition 3
(i) If the recycled output is supplied in abundance, then the ”losing” retailer
would not be constrained in its downstream supply of the recycled good along
the oﬀ-equilibrium path where it wins the split award auction. Then, B∗2 (0) is a
function of qA, because the residual demand for the recycled good is a function
of the contemporaneous supply of the primary good. In this case, absent vertical
restraints, the manufacturer would overproduce in period 2 in order to lower the
profitability of selling any given amount of the recycled good, thus reducing the
”losing” retailer’s bid in the split award auction. Any quantity target which
removes the manufacturer’s incentive to overproduce in the second period will
therefore increase the manufacturer’s market power and thus lower consumer
surplus.
(ii) If instead the recycled output is in short supply, then B∗2 (0) is a function
of qa, the early period output, because the resource constraint binds along the
oﬀ-equilibrium path where the ”losing” retailer wins the split award auction.
In this case, the manufacturer will underproduce in the first period in order to
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lower the ”losing” retailer’s bid in the second period auction. This underpro-
duction harms both firms and consumers: therefore, both the vertical structure
and consumers are better oﬀ if the manufacturer’s incentive to underproduce is
removed by the appropriate vertical restraints.2
Proof of Proposition 5 Marx and Shaﬀer (2004) show that there are two
reasons why rent extraction may fail:
(i) The buyer has bargaining power, so that rent extraction requires the first
seller’s oﬀering a below-cost price for the oﬀ-equilibrium case where negotiations
between the buyer and the second seller fail. The entrant will then be forced
to match this ”reward” to obtain a contract with the buyer, and this reward
will then be shared among buyer and first seller. In our case, the buyer has
no bargaining power at all (recall that manufacturers make take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀers); in other words, we are in the Aghion and Bolton (1987) setting where it is
suﬃcient for the first seller to impose penalties on the buyer in case of successful
contracting with the entrant (instead of ”rewards” for not contracting with the
entrant). In this case, the entrant must compensate the buyer for the penalty
in order to obtain a contract, and the penalty is then shared among buyer
and first seller. Thus, if the buyer has no bargaining power, the constraint of
above-cost-pricing is never binding.
(ii) Contracts cannot be contingent on competitor’s output. If market share
contracts are not admissible (and this is the case for dominant firms in the Euro-
pean Union), then the first seller’s contract with the buyer cannot discriminate
between exclusivity and common agency. In other words, the first seller must
oﬀer the same price for a certain level of qA1, independently of whether the
buyer also carries the rival brand or not, i.e. whether qA2 > 0 or qA2 = 0.
If this is the case, then there is a lower bound on the second-period payoﬀs
that the entrant can appropriate. Denote by RCA the revenue generated under
common agency, by Ti (qAi) the contract between retailer and manufacturer
i = 1, 2, by ci (qAi) the production cost of manufacturer i = 1, 2, and by ΠEDR
the retailer’s disagreement payoﬀ4 :
ΠEDR = R
¡
qEDA1 , 0, q
ED
B
¢
− T1
¡
qEDA1 , 0, q
ED
B
¢
− cBqEDB ≥ ΠB
Then, the entrant’s payoﬀ under common agency in the second period is:
ΠCA2 = R
CA − T1
¡
qCAA1 , q
CA
A2 , q
CA
B
¢
− c2
¡
qCAA2
¢
− cBqCAB −ΠEDR (13)
The common-agency rent to be shared among entrant and retailer, RCA −
T1
¡
qCAA1 , q
CA
A2
¢
−c2
¡
qCAA2
¢
, must be at least what the retailer-entrant pair can get
if the retailer, instead of qCAA1 , purchases the ”exclusivity” quantity q
ED
A1 from
4Note that the retailer’s disagreement payoﬀ in period 2 can always be extracted by the
incumbent through the first-period contract with the retailer.
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the incumbent, and then maximizes residual profits with the entrant:
RCA − T1
¡
qCAA1 , q
CA
A2
¢
− c2
¡
qCAA2
¢
− cBqCAB ≥
≥ maxqA2,qB≤σqa R
¡
qEDA1 , qA2, qB
¢
− T1
¡
qEDA1 , 0, q
ED
B
¢
− c2 (qA2)− cBqB
(14)
If this incentive constraint is satisfied, the entrant has no incentive to act op-
portunistically, i.e. to let the retailer buy qEDA1 at the favorable rate T1
¡
qEDA1 , 0
¢
that the incumbent only oﬀers if no trade with the entrant occurs, although the
retailer will then carry positive levels of the entrant’s output as well.
If the incentive constraint is binding, we can insert the right-hand side terms
into expression (13) to obtain:
ΠCA2 = max
qA2,qB≤σqa
©
Π
¡
qEDA1 , qA2, qB
¢
−Π
¡
qEDA1 , 0, q
ED
B
¢ª
Now, the optimal contract between the incumbent and the retailer will min-
imize the rent that must be left to the entrant:
min
{qEDA1 ,qEDB ≤σqa}
max
{qA2,qB≤σqa}
©
Π
¡
qEDA1 , qA2, qB
¢
−Π
¡
qEDA1 , 0, q
ED
B
¢ª
(15)
(i) If
©
qEDA1 , q
ED
B ≤ σqa
ª
can be set so as to reduce ΠCA2 to zero, then full
rent extraction is possible even without market share contracts, and so there
will be no distortion in either first- or second-period output.
If the entrant’s minmax payoﬀ at the solution to (15) is strictly positive but
the resource constraint is not binding anywhere, then there will be no distortion
in either first- or second-period output even though full rent extraction is not
possible. This completes the proof of part (i) of Proposition 5.
(ii) If the entrant’s minmax payoﬀ is strictly positive, then the qA2 that
solves (15) is strictly positive, which in turn implies that the entrant’s choice
of qB is strictly lower than the incumbent’s choice of qEDB . Thus, we can ei-
ther have
©
qEDB = σqa and qB < σqa
ª
, or
©
qEDB = σqa and qB = σqa
ª
, but not©
qEDB < σqa and qB = σqa
ª
.
If
©
qEDB = σqa and qB < σqa
ª
, then the entrant’s minmax payoﬀ is decreas-
ing in σqa: A marginal increase in qa relaxes the constraint on the incumbent’s
part of the minmax problem, whithout aﬀecting the choice set of the entrant’s
part, so that the minmax payoﬀ can only decrease, but not increase. In other
words, expanding first-period output will allow the incumbent manufacturer
to extract a larger share of the entrant’s second-period rent. This creates an
incentive to overproduce in the pre-entry period.
If instead
©
qEDB = σqa and qB = σqa
ª
, then relaxing the resource constraint
will increase both Π
¡
qEDA1 , qA2, qB
¢
and Π
¡
qEDA1 , 0, q
ED
B
¢
, so that it is not obvious
what the net eﬀect on the entrant’s minmax profits will be. Suppose for a
moment that following a marginal increase in qa, the incumbent leaves qEDA1
unchanged and only adjusts qEDB . The entrant will also adjust qB, but the
eﬀect of this adjustment on Π
¡
qEDA1 , qA2, qB
¢
is likely to be smaller than the
net eﬀect of the same increase in qEDB on Π
¡
qEDA1 , 0, q
ED
B
¢
. The reason is that
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the entrant’s own primary output, qA2, partially compensates for the shortage
in qB. Therefore, an expansion in qB will not translate 1:1 into an increase in
profits, but it will first trigger a (downward) adjustment of qA2, so that the
net eﬀect on Π
¡
qEDA1 , qA2, qB
¢
is smaller than for Π
¡
qEDA1 , 0, q
ED
B
¢
. Of course,
the incumbent’s choice of qEDA1 will not remain unaﬀected by the increase in qa,
but this only creates an additional instrument for the incumbent to reduce the
entrant’s minmax profits after the resource constraint on good B was relaxed.
Again, a higher level of first-period output allows the incumbent to extract more
rent in the second period, and therefore creates an incentive to overproduce.
This completes the proof of Proposition 5.2
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